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Abstract 
 
Dual screening during televised election debates is a new domain in which political elites and 
journalists seek to influence audience attitudes and behavior. But to what extent do non-elite dual 
screeners seek to influence others, particularly their social media followers, social media users in 
general, and even politicians and journalists? And how does this behavior affect short- and longer-
term engagement with election campaigns? Using unique, event-based, panel survey data from the 
main 2015 UK general election debate (Wave 1=2,351; Wave 2=1,168) we reveal the conditions 
under which people experience agency, empowerment, and engagement now that social media have 
reconfigured broadcast political television. 
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Digitally-mediated commentary now accompanies broadcast political media events of all kinds, 
reconfiguring Dayan and Katz’s classic (1992) model of media events. Building on our earlier 
research, we define this as dual screening and conceptualize it as “the bundle of practices that 
involve integrating, and switching across and between, live broadcast media and social media” 
(Vaccari et al, 2015: 1041). Previously we studied the 2014 EU election debates in the United 
Kingdom and found that active, “lean-forward” dual screening practices, such as commenting live 
on social media as a debate unfolds, and engaging with conversations via Twitter hashtags, have the 
strongest and most consistent positive associations with political engagement (Vaccari et al, 2015). 
In this current article we shift our focus to motivations and influence and their links with cognitive 
and behavioral engagement. We break new ground in two ways. First, we use uniquely suitable data 
to assess the significance of dual screeners’ motivations to acquire information, share information 
and opinions, and influence others, including politicians and journalists. Second, we analyze the 
links between these motivations and individuals’ short-term and longer-term engagement with an 
election campaign. 
Our data for this article come from Britain’s live, televised 2015 general election debate, 
broadcast by national channel ITV on April 2, 2015. With 7.4 million viewers (a 33 percent evening 
audience share) this was the main television event of the campaign and the first debate in British 
history to feature all seven major and minor party leaders on one stage. We used large-scale Twitter 
data to identify a sample of individuals who dual screened the debate. We then ran our own custom-
designed, two-wave panel survey on this sample and analyzed the responses using a series of 
multivariate statistical models (N=2,351 for wave 1; 1,168 for wave 2).  
 Our research design avoids some of the limitations of existing work on dual screening. Not 
only does our approach get inside individuals’ live dual screening experiences, it also allows us to 
look outside the live moment and explore how these experiences may explain subsequent attitudes 
and behaviors, both online and offline. We were also able to examine the characteristics of large 
numbers of social media users and go beyond examining influence by small numbers of politicians 
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and media professionals. And, in contrast with previous research, we were able to design a custom 
survey that explicitly tapped individuals’ motivations to influence others, as well as their estimated 
success in doing so. 
There is much at stake here for the future of democratic engagement. Weeks and colleagues 
end their recent study of online opinion leaders (2015: 9) by questioning whether “prosumer” 
behavior online contributes to “the democratic process at large.” While the concept of influence 
often has pejorative associations with elite manipulation and spin, the long tradition of research on 
opinion leadership stretching back to Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) is more positive: if sufficiently 
diffused, influence-oriented behavior can produce democratic goods for the polity. If dual screening 
affords individuals the capacity and opportunity to influence others, including elites, and it boosts 
their behavioral and cognitive engagement, it may make a contribution to the democratic renewal of 
electoral politics. 
 
Understanding Why People Dual Screen Political Debates: Information, Sharing, Influence, 
and Engagement 
Dual-screening is potentially reshaping political agency and the effects might scale up to alter the 
structure of communication relating to a televised political debate and the broader election 
campaign. Debates are now characterized by competition, conflict, and partisanship but also 
interdependence among actors who attempt to steer the flow and meanings of debate-related news. 
Journalists and politicians have integrated social media into their working practices. Broadcasters 
commission social media sentiment analysis, real-time online polls, and present vox-pop tweets 
from the viewing public to provide a demotic presence in the studio and post-event “spin room.” 
However, the power of political staff and journalists is increasingly prone to disruption by social 
media user-audience networks (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2015; Chadwick, 2011a, 2011b). 
Event-based studies have shown that people use social media to acquire information and 
news about the campaign, share information and opinions with others, and to try to influence the 
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interpretive framing of their online followers, journalists, and politicians (Chadwick, 2011a, 2011b; 
Freelon & Karpf, 2015; Mascaro & Goggins, 2015; Wohn and Na, 2011). People evaluate and fact-
check television presenters and try to place marginalized issues on reporters’ agendas. They create 
and circulate specific hashtags, send publicly accessible tweets to journalists and campaign elites, 
craft satirical posts in attempts to generate shareable memes and viral information cascades, and try 
to subvert official news framings through the use of culturally-resonant affect, counterpoint, satire, 
exaggeration, sarcasm, trolling, and fake accounts. This is, in effect, a much more widely 
distributed, social media-enabled set of behaviors than those identified in Lang and Lang’s (2002) 
broadcast-era work on the role of television presenter commentary in shaping audience perceptions. 
Previous research on the links between motivations and political engagement is also 
relevant. Our approach here is rooted in the dialogical tradition, which posits that the complex array 
of motivations and practices involved in an act of public expression can come to reshape the beliefs 
and behavior of the addresser as well as the addressee (Bakhtin, 1981; for recent work of relevance 
see for example Pingree, 2007; Shah, 2016). There is strong evidence that people are motivated to 
use the internet to acquire further information about politics and that this, in turn, can lead to 
increased interpersonal discussion and political messaging via email (Shah et al, 2005). Since the 
rise of social media, attention has shifted to how individuals’ motivations to express themselves in 
their online social networks can interact with news use and spur political engagement (Gil de 
Zúñiga et al, 2014). There is also evidence of a broader shift toward an “actualizing” style of 
citizenship nourished by self-expressive behavior (Bennett, Wells & Freelon, 2011). Similarly, 
Vraga and colleagues (2015) found that issue-specific engagement using Facebook is associated 
with enhanced political efficacy and self-reported opinion leadership. Study of the motivations for 
dual screening, as opposed to social media use in general, is in its infancy. However, Gil de Zúñiga 
and colleagues (2015) found that information-seeking and the motivation to discuss politics with 
others were linked to dual screening for news as well as subsequent online engagement. 
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The communicative context during and immediately after a televised debate is relatively 
fertile. These are long and complex events containing many policy statements and subtle behavioral 
cues, very few of which become salient in journalists’ reports and audience reactions. When they do 
become salient, it makes a difference to individuals’ responses (Shah et al, 2015). Older studies of 
traditional (not dual-screened) viewing of US primary and presidential debates have shown that 
these events can affect individuals’ levels of information, attitudes to the candidates, engagement, 
efficacy, and even vote choice (see for example Benoit et al., 2003; McKinney and Warner, 2013). 
Good data are thin on the ground in the UK context because live party leaders’ debates only began 
in 2010. However, in that year the Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg enjoyed a surge in his 
personal ratings after his appearance in the televised debates, when dual screeners introduced the 
hashtags #iagreewithnick and #nickcleggsfault (Chadwick, 2011a). 
We should also examine the short-term “opportunity structure” (Chadwick, 2011b: 5–8) that 
now shapes engagement immediately after a broadcast event. Getting involved soon after a debate 
offers individuals the opportunity to influence others’ perceptions of the debate itself. Actions can 
be timed for when politicians, campaign workers, professional journalists, and political activists are 
involved in a struggle to define the candidates’ key strengths and weaknesses. However, post-debate 
actions like contributing to post-debate donation surges, voting in online petitions and polls, or 
following a party leader on Twitter are not narrowly instrumental; they are also indirect information 
signals designed to influence broader perceptions. These forms of engagement leave visible traces 
that can be read by others as signs of support for a candidate or cause (Chadwick, 2013: 124–5). 
This is all the more important because substantial proportions of social network users are 
relatively uninterested in politics and/or undecided in their political preferences. These individuals 
might gain campaign engagement benefits from being serendipitously exposed to dual-screened 
content about a televised political debate.1 At the same time, more politically-interested dual 
                                                 
1 Data from the 2015 British Election Study (BES) post-election survey show that that 41.8 percent of the 52.8 percent 
of total survey respondents who reported using either Facebook or Twitter were “not very interested” or “not at all 
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screeners may learn more about the ‘rules of the game’ of politics (Holton et al., 2015: 2540) and 
how to more successfully exercise influence over others. 
In light of these themes, we based our study on four research questions. The first two probed 
individuals’ motivations to dual screen the ITV debate and their perceptions of the outcome of their 
behaviors. The third and fourth probed the subsequent implications of dual screening for short-term 
and longer-term forms of engagement with the election. 
 RQ1. What kinds of motivations lead Twitter users to dual screen political debates and what 
kinds of social and political characteristics are associated with these motivations? 
 RQ2. How do individuals perceive the influence-related outcomes of their dual screening 
experiences? 
 RQ3. Are there any relationships between dual screening behaviors and engagement in the 
important post-debate opportunity structure immediately after a debate? 
 RQ4. Are there any relationships between dual screening a debate and engagement that 
persists until after election day? 
 
Research Design and Method 
By 2015, 27 percent of Britain’s population reported checking their social media feeds while 
watching television.2 By 2013, 22 percent of the British population used Twitter, making it the 
second most popular social networking site in the United Kingdom, after Facebook. And, by 2014, 
60 percent of UK Twitter users reported using the service while watching television (Vaccari et al, 
2015: 1047). 
 The unique nature of dual screening requires research designs that integrate the digitally-
mediated, episodic, personalized, and event-based forms of political engagement that are now 
important for politics. We deployed two custom-built surveys: one immediately after the event and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
interested” in politics (N=2,987). See http://www.britishelectionstudy.com. For the importance of serendipitous 
exposure from dual screening see Vaccari et al., 2015. 
 7 
a second the day after election day. While we acknowledge that self-reports are no substitute for 
directly-observed behavior, it is only from surveys that we can learn about how large numbers of 
individuals actually experience dual screening and what they tend to do outside of the live, dual 
screening moment. 
  
The April 2, 2015 ITV #Leadersdebate 
Professional media covered the ITV leaders’ debate intensely. The two-hour broadcast attracted 7.4 
million viewers—a large (33%) audience share for the evening.3 We defined our population as those 
Twitter users who posted at least one tweet about the debate during a six hour period—the two 
hours before the debate, during the debate itself, and the two hours immediately after the debate had 
ended. We chose this time frame in order to tap both the build-up to the debate and the initial 
discussions on its outcome, when Twitter activity spikes and interpretive frames are up for grabs 
(Chadwick, 2011a). To identify our population, we mined Twitter’s Streaming API4 from 6pm until 
midnight on April 2 for tweets containing “#leadersdebate,” which ITV had earlier announced as 
the event’s official hashtag. This was a Twitter trending topic in Britain during the entire day and 
the top trending topic in Britain and worldwide during the debate. In total, we collected 516,484 
tweets (including retweets) posted by 164,262 unique users. From this population we randomly 
selected a sample of 32,854 users. We then used several Twitter accounts—created specifically for 
this project and clearly indicating our institutional affiliation and research—to invite these users to 
take our Wave 1 survey. The Wave 1 survey invitations were sent between April 3 and April 6, 
2015; responses were collected until April 12, 2015.5 
 In total, 2,351 users completed our Wave 1 survey—7.2 percent of the 32,854 Twitter users 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2 See http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/ (accessed March 10, 2016). 
3 See http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/03/7m-people-watched-leaders-debate-itv-seven-etchingham 
(accessed March 10, 2016). 
4 Twitter’s Streaming API allows researchers to retrieve public Twitter messages in real time, together with relevant 
metadata. See https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview (accessed November 28, 2016). 
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to whom we sent invitations. Respondents took, on average, about 23 minutes to complete the 
survey. Of these 2,351 respondents, 1,832 provided their Twitter name and/or email address and 
agreed to be contacted by us in future. This enabled us to survey these 1,832 respondents again 
immediately after election day, for our Wave 2 survey. Wave 2 ran from the day immediately after 
the general election (Friday, May 8) to June 16, 2015, and generated 1,168 responses. These 1,168 
respondents thus constitute our two-wave panel for exploring longer-term engagement with the 
campaign. Despite our unorthodox method, the panel had a healthy retention rate of 64 percent. Our 
online appendix6 provides extensive information on the characteristics of our respondents and the 
survey questions we used for our analysis below, as well as evidence from a separate benchmarking 
survey we conducted on a nationally-representative sample of UK internet users. The benchmarking 
data show that our sample is remarkably similar to our target population and our data are well-
suited to our research questions. As we shall see below, our cross-sectional data revealed significant 
associations between motivations, perceived outcomes, and short-term engagement. Our panel data 
yield insights on the enduring influence of dual screening. Most studies of social media and 
engagement have relied solely on cross-sectional data. Panel designs tend to find fewer and weaker 
associations between media and engagement (Boulianne, 2015), but generate robust estimates of 
stability and change because they allow us to control for the values of the dependent variables 
measured at an earlier point in time. 
 
Results 
We adopted a multi-phase approach, in which the dependent variables differ according to the 
research question. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 The surveys were hosted at Qualtrics. For more detail on the survey and question wording please consult our online 
appendix at http://files.andrewchadwick.com/Chadwick-OLoughlin-Vaccari-JoBEM-2017-Online-Appendix.pdf  
6 Available at http://files.andrewchadwick.com/Chadwick-OLoughlin-Vaccari-JoBEM-2017-Online-Appendix.pdf. 
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RQ1: Motivations for Dual Screening the Debate: Information, Sharing, Influence, and their 
Attitudinal and Behavioral Correlates 
To identify motivations for dual-screening the debate, our survey contained three pairs of questions 
about the importance of acquiring new information, sharing information and opinions with others, 
and attempting to influence other social media users and professional media. Respondents attributed 
greater importance to acquiring information (mean = 4.00, SD = 1.55) and sharing information and 
opinions (mean = 3.98, SD = 1.72) than influencing other social media users and professional media 
(mean = 2.55, SD = 2.04; all variables range 0-6). Table 1 shows how individuals’ socio-
demographic characteristics, political characteristics, and social media use predict these 
motivations. 
 - Table 1 here - 
The data reveal interesting differences in the variables that predict the three sets of motivations we 
investigated. While women were significantly more likely to dual screen to acquire information, 
men were significantly more likely to seek influence. Those who scored low on political efficacy 
and who did not feel they were learning enough from the campaign to make an informed choice 
were significantly more likely to dual screen to acquire information, as were those who reported 
greater levels of political news use. Those who identified with a political party and reported higher 
levels of political efficacy were significantly more likely to aim to share information and opinions 
while dual screening, while those who sought to influence others had significantly higher levels of 
interest in politics. 
 Levels of attention to the campaign were positively and significantly associated with the 
motivation to acquire information and to share information and opinion. Online political 
engagement was positively and significantly associated with all three motivations, while offline 
political engagement was positively and significantly associated with the motivation to share 
content and influence others. Frequency of access to Twitter was positively and significantly 
associated with the motivation to acquire information and share information and opinions, while 
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frequency of access to other social media was positively and significantly associated with the desire 
to influence others. 
 
RQ2: Perceived Influence-Related and Cognitive Outcomes of Dual Screening 
In Table 2, we show how dual screening shaped individuals’ sense of their own agency to influence 
others and the feeling they had learned information that was valuable for their vote decision. We 
asked respondents to state if their comments on the debate on Twitter influenced four distinct 
groups we chose for their rank order in terms of probable difficulty: their own Twitter followers, 
Twitter users in general, journalists, and politicians. In the aggregate, our respondents were modest 
in assessing their ability to influence others: 55.6 percent claimed to have at least “a little” influence 
on their own followers, 38 percent on Twitter users in general, 11.7 percent on journalists, and 11.2 
percent on politicians. We also asked respondents how much they believed discussing the debate on 
Twitter helped them in their voting decision. A plurality of respondents (42.8%) claimed it was 
“somewhat helpful”; 12.9 percent deemed it “very helpful.” 
 Together with independent variables relating to social and political characteristics, Table 2 
also includes variables measuring particular dual screening behaviors and Twitter affordances that 
we found in our previous research to be important for shaping political engagement (Vaccari et al., 
2015). We included the following: whether an individual had watched the debate live on television, 
tuned in to the debate after having read about it on social media, or read about or commented on the 
debate on social media. The variables that tap specific Twitter affordances for dual screening were: 
reading tweets about the debate in one’s timeline, encountering information via hashtags, being sent 
an @message or a direct message about the debate, and searching for comments on the debates 
using the Twitter search bar. Finally, we added the motivational dependent variables from our first 
model—acquiring information, sharing information and opinions, and seeking influence—as 
independent variables. This allowed us to gauge whether these motivations were in fact satisfied. 
- Table 2 here - 
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Table 2 shows that all three motivations for dual screening the debate—acquiring information, 
sharing information and opinions, and influencing others—positively and significantly correlate 
with the view that dual screening assisted with deciding how to vote. The motivation to dual screen 
to influence others was positively and significantly associated with respondents’ perceptions that 
they had influenced all of the groups we asked about: their Twitter followers, Twitter users in 
general, journalists, and politicians. The desire to share information and opinions was positively and 
significantly associated with respondents’ perceptions of having influenced their immediate Twitter 
network and the broader network of Twitter users, but not journalists and politicians. Those who 
mostly valued acquiring information were significantly more likely to feel they had influenced 
Twitter users in general. 
 Consistent with our findings on motivations from Table 1, men were significantly more 
likely than women to perceive that their comments on Twitter were influential on their followers, 
but women were significantly more likely to report that dual screening was useful for their voting 
decision. 
 Table 2 also unearths intriguing relationships between the perceived outcomes of dual 
screening and important political characteristics. Those with higher levels of political news use 
were significantly more likely to report their discussions on Twitter had an influence on journalists. 
Respondents who were more politically-engaged offline were significantly more likely to perceive 
that their discussions influenced their followers and Twitter users in general, as were respondents 
with higher levels of online engagement, though these latter individuals also felt significantly more 
influential on journalists. By contrast, political interest and efficacy were negatively and 
significantly associated with finding the discussions useful for deciding how to vote, while political 
interest was also negatively and significantly associated with perceived influence over Twitter 
users.  
 Perceptions of influence and assistance with voting decision were also associated with 
specific dual screening practices and Twitter affordances. Our measure of serendipitous exposure—
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tuning in to the television debate after reading about it on social media—was positively and 
significantly correlated with acquiring information that helped with deciding how to vote and with 
perceived influence on Twitter users, journalists, and politicians. Similarly, those who followed 
debate hashtags were significantly more likely to see themselves as influential on Twitter users and 
on politicians. Engaging with hashtags and seeing debate-related posts on one’s timeline were also 
positively and significantly associated with finding dual screening useful in deciding how to vote. 
Respondents who commented on the debate on social media and who received debate-related tweets 
mentioning their username or direct messages also reported significantly higher levels of influence 
on their followers and Twitter users in general.  
 
RQ3: Dual Screening and Immediate Post-Debate Engagement 
Our third research question investigates relationships between dual screening behaviors and 
engagement in the immediate aftermath of the debate. The dependent variable measuring post-
debate engagement is an index comprising eight different activities, including, for example, signing 
an online petition related to the debate, donating money, voting in an online poll related to the 
debate, or signing up to volunteer for a party or cause. These speak to our discussion about short-
term, post-debate engagement as both direct intervention in politics and indirect information 
signaling designed to influence the perceptions of others. The average value of the index of post-
debate engagement, which ranges from 0–8, was 1.38 (SD = 1.45). Because the dependent variable 
is a count, we employed Poisson regression with robust standard errors.7 As with Table 2, we build 
on our previous model by adding the dependent variables from the previous table—perceived 
influence on others and assistance with voting decision—as independent variables.8 
- Table 3 here - 
                                                 
7 As the ratio between the model’s Chi square coefficient and the number of degrees of freedom is lower than 1 (.969), 
we can conclude that overdispersion does not affect our data and that our model overestimates the standard errors. 
8 Here we recoded perceived influence on others as a combined measure. See the online appendix at 
http://files.andrewchadwick.com/Chadwick-OLoughlin-Vaccari-JoBEM-2017-Online-Appendix.pdf  
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As Table 3, column 1 shows, those identifying with a party and those more engaged online and 
offline reported participating in a significantly higher number of post-debate activities. In addition, 
the perception that dual screening assisted with one’s voting decision and the perception of having 
influenced others were positive and significant predictors of post-debate engagement. Interestingly, 
the motivation to dual screen to acquire information was positively and significantly associated with 
post-debate engagement, but the motivations to share content and to influence others were not. 
 Specific dual-screening behaviors and Twitter affordances also matter for short-term post-
debate engagement. In a finding that echoes Vaccari et al (2015), relatively active behaviors such as 
commenting on the debate on social media, encountering hashtag-centered discussions and 
searching for information using the Twitter search bar are positive and significant predictors of 
post-debate engagement. Even relatively passive social media behaviors such as reading about the 
debates on social media and receiving mentions and direct messages about the debate were 
positively and significantly associated with post-debate engagement. 
  
RQ4: Dual Screening and Longer-Term Engagement 
Our final research question concerned the relationship between dual screening the debate and any 
engagement that persists until after election day. Here we use our panel data, which we gathered in 
the post-election survey. In both waves, the majority of our respondents said they were following 
the campaign “very closely”: 59 percent in Wave 1; 70 percent in Wave 2. In Wave 1, 72 percent 
reported they were learning enough to make an informed choice; in Wave 2, 81 percent reported 
this. 
 As columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 reveal, we found important relationships between dual 
screening and cognitive engagement during the remainder of the campaign. Respondents who 
commented via social media on the debate were more likely to increase both their attention to the 
campaign and their perceptions that they had learned enough to make an informed choice. These 
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relationships are statistically significant even after controlling for all the variables shown in Table 
3—including the value of the dependent variables recorded at Wave 1. 
 
Discussion 
How do we make sense of these results? In this section we show how they shed light on the 
motivations for dual screening and how these motivations relate to individuals’ social and political 
characteristics (RQ1); how dual screening assists with vote choice and contributes to the perception 
of influence over others (RQ2); how it shapes engagement in the immediate post-debate opportunity 
structure (RQ3); and how it provides longer-term cognitive benefits (RQ4). 
 With regard to RQ1, dual screening is seen by many respondents as an opportunity to fulfill 
their civic duties by plugging information gaps left by routine campaign news. Individuals who felt 
they had not learned enough from the campaign and who had a weaker sense of their own political 
efficacy were particularly keen to dual screen to acquire information. Dual screening’s role as a 
civic ritual is confirmed by our finding that even those who were paying close attention to the 
campaign and who reported higher levels of news usage still wanted to dual screen to acquire and 
share information. These people already had a relatively rich diet of political information but they 
dual screened to further enrich it. This civic ritual role was also highlighted by the positive 
associations between respondents’ political participation and their motivations for dual screening. 
Dual screening to spread information and influence others is a new and important part of the 
political behavior of those who already have the broadest engagement repertoires, both online and 
offline.  
 However, dual screening to influence others is a strident act of citizenship, and more likely 
to lead to active agency. This may contribute to explaining the gender agency divide we found, with 
women more likely to be motivated to acquire information and men more likely to be interested in 
influencing others. This surprising finding raises important questions, which we discuss in our 
Conclusion. 
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 Our results show that dual screening the debate had important positive cognitive 
engagement outcomes, even after controlling for a wide range of other variables (RQ2). Those who 
were motivated to influence journalists and politicians clearly found dual screening useful for doing 
so. Those who mostly valued sharing information and opinions could see that their behavior might 
have had some influence on their immediate Twitter network and the broader network of Twitter 
users, but not on journalists and politicians. Thus, there is an important divide here. On one side are 
individuals who are highly motivated to achieve interpersonal influence, and who wish to take 
opinion leadership to new heights by orienting their behavior toward influencing not only their own 
Twitter followers but also professional media and politicians. This behavior partly reverses the 
direction of flow in traditional models of opinion leadership: it involves individuals acting back on 
elites rather than simply re-transmitting elites’ messages. On the other side of the divide, however, 
sit those who follow a more conventional model of opinion leadership that involves sharing 
information and opinion, and influencing their own followers and Twitter users in general, but not 
media and political elites. We revisit the significance of this divide in our Conclusion. 
 The positive association we found between higher levels of news use and the perception of 
having influenced journalists while dual screening augments this point about information flows. As 
highlighted in our conceptual discussion, qualitative studies of the integration of social media 
behavior with broadcast content have found that individuals use social media to introduce 
information that journalists and political actors find useful in their strategies to bolster or contest an 
emerging interpretation (Chadwick, 2011a; 2011b). The findings from this study refine this point: 
individuals who regularly engage with news are more likely to use social media to plug in to news-
making assemblages and try to influence journalists during a televised debate. This suggests that 
news consumption in general is an important civic driver in the dual screening environment. 
 It would be a mistake, however, to simply state that dual screening reinforces existing 
engagement inequalities. After all, our results show that political interest and efficacy were 
negatively associated with finding the discussions useful for deciding how to vote, while political 
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interest was also negatively associated with perceived influence over Twitter users in general. What 
this means is that respondents who were less politically efficacious and less interested in politics 
received relatively greater cognitive and influence benefits from dual screening the debate. They 
were more likely to see their behavior as influencing Twitter users in general and to see dual 
screening as having helped with their vote decision. Although this finding should be treated with 
some caution because our survey respondents as a whole were skewed toward the politically 
interested,9 it nonetheless reveals how dual screening can boost the capacity of people who are less 
engaged in politics but drawn into social media discussion of high-stakes, broadcast political events. 
 In addition, serendipitous exposure to the debate via dual screening provided important 
cognitive and influence benefits. People who were not planning to watch the debate, but who ended 
up tuning in on television after reading about it online, derived the greatest cognitive and influence 
rewards. They reported influencing Twitter users in general, journalists, and politicians, and 
acquiring information that helped with deciding how to vote. We consider this finding related to 
influence benefits particularly surprising and powerful. Not only does it generally reinforce the 
finding that dual screening can boost the capacity of the less engaged, it also reveals how a specific 
bundle of behaviors that are such an important part of the dual screening experience—switching to 
dual screen using social media and television after reading about an event on social media—can 
empower individuals to exercise opinion leadership. Hashtags also play a role here. They appear to 
enable individuals to explore content and interact with users to which they may not normally be 
exposed. This may explain why people who engaged with hashtags also experienced influence and 
cognitive benefits. 
 Our results also indicate that dual screening spurs those who are already politically-engaged 
to try to extend their influence by engaging in the immediate post-debate opportunity structure 
(RQ3). Dual screening now appears to be well integrated with existing online and offline 
                                                 
9 See our online appendix at http://files.andrewchadwick.com/Chadwick-OLoughlin-Vaccari-JoBEM-2017-Online-
Appendix.pdf. 
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engagement repertoires and partisan identifications. However, it is not simply that dual screening 
provides these opportunities for the highly engaged. As the results show, those who were more 
likely to be open to influence (because they sought information rather than sought to share 
information and influence others) also reported higher levels of post-debate engagement. We see 
this as a positive outcome for those with a comparatively weaker sense of agency. Influence-seekers 
are not the only ones who become politically active after dual screening a debate; information-
seekers do, too. 
 Finally, commenting on a debate while dual screening plays an important role in enhancing 
long-term cognitive engagement with a campaign (RQ4). This was the case even among those who 
were already attentive to, and learning from, the campaign. Indeed, while we have taken care to 
address the complexity of the relationships between dual screening motivations, perceived 
outcomes, and engagement, taken overall, the practice of commenting on the debate via social 
media emerges as one of the most important variables in our analysis. It positively predicts 
perceived influence on one’s Twitter followers and Twitter users in general (RQ2), immediate post-
debate engagement (RQ3), and longer-term attentiveness and learning (RQ4). 
 
Conclusion 
We found significant evidence that dual screening has some positive influences on individuals’ 
sense of political agency and both their short- and longer-term engagement with an election 
campaign. These influences derive from the complex, reconfigured context of today’s televised 
political debates. 
 Our analysis also sheds light on how power might come to be exercised in the post-debate 
opportunity structure. Dual screening enables individuals to continue to assert their agency in the 
important immediate post-debate period, and signal their support for a candidate or party to others. 
Indeed, our finding that party identification is positively linked with post-debate engagement 
suggests that further research might explore the role parties play in structuring how citizens express 
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their support during the period when frame dominance is being determined. 
 Our study provides further evidence that the hybrid mix of television and social media can 
lead to positive outcomes for democratic engagement beyond those who are political “junkies” (cf. 
de Zúñiga et al, 2015; Vaccari et al, 2015). Dual screening is not simply a “weapon of the strong.” 
While we caution that our sample is skewed toward the politically-interested, we still found 
evidence that those who were less politically efficacious and less politically-interested were more 
likely to receive cognitive and influence-related benefits from dual screening. For these individuals, 
dual screening appears to be useful for learning about the election and gaining influence over 
Twitter users beyond their own followers, though this influence does not extend to journalists and 
politicians. Similarly, those who sought to acquire information from the debate actually reported 
higher levels of post-debate engagement. Dual screening appears to have nudged these information-
seekers to get involved immediately after the debate. Serendipity plays a role here, too. The greatest 
cognitive and influence rewards were experienced by those who did not actually plan to watch the 
televised debate but who ended up watching after reading about it on social media. This is an 
intriguing reversal of an earlier process identified by Bimber and Davis (2003), who found that 
serendipitous exposure to a candidate via television prompted individuals to search for the 
candidate online and get more involved in a campaign.  
 Social media affordances are important in explaining the difference dual screening can make 
to political television. Using social media to read about and to comment on the debate, encountering 
Twitter hashtags, searching Twitter, and being exposed to debate-related messages posted by others 
mentioning one’s username were all associated with higher levels of immediate post-debate 
engagement. Those who followed discussions on hashtags reported that their comments had 
influenced Twitter users in general and politicians; they also reported that such conversations 
assisted with vote choice. And, as our Wave 2 data revealed, social media use during dual screening 
also had positive longer-term influences on cognitive engagement with the campaign. Even after 
controlling for a wide range of other variables and the responses of individuals at Wave 1, 
 19 
commenting on the debate on social media was positively associated with increased attention to the 
campaign and learning enough to make an informed vote choice. Social media, particularly Twitter, 
are essential ingredients for political engagement during and after mediated political events. They 
make it more likely that people will feel empowered, become politically engaged immediately after 
the debate, acquire information that is useful in forming political judgments, and maintain higher 
levels of cognitive engagement during the rest of the campaign. 
 Taken together, these findings are important confirmation of the additional benefits of 
increased agency, empowerment, and engagement that people experience now that social media 
have reconfigured previously unidirectional, broadcast-only political television. 
 At the same time, our argument is tempered by two important caveats. The first is our finding 
that there is a motivations and influence divide. There are highly motivated influencers who 
strategically and, in their own assessments, successfully influence their own Twitter followers, 
Twitter users in general, journalists, and politicians. As we mentioned in our theoretical discussion 
these people reverse the top-down direction of flow of Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) classic two-
step flow model of opinion leadership, further complicating what “personal influence” actually 
means in today’s media systems (Dubois and Gaffney, 2014). On the other side of this divide are 
those who prioritize sharing information and opinions and only see their influence spreading as far 
as their own Twitter followers and Twitter users in general. Of course, influence over Twitter users 
beyond one’s immediate followers should not be dismissed lightly: it is an agentic act. However, 
because it is not aimed at elites, it conforms more closely to the traditional top-down model of 
opinion leadership. 
 The second caveat is our unexpected identification of what we tentatively label the gender 
agency divide. In the case of the 2015 ITV leaders’ debate, women dual screeners were more likely 
to be information-seekers and report that dual screening had assisted with their voting decisions. 
Men were more likely to be influence-seekers and report that they had achieved influence over 
others. Does dual screening political debates therefore reinforce patterns of gender inequality 
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unearthed by previous research on political engagement (see for example Burns, Schlozman and 
Verba, 2001)? Is this finding unique to our data or related in some way to a complex array of other 
gender-related variables that we did not include in our design? It could be that under certain 
conditions women are less motivated than men to engage in the active commenting practices that 
are important for achieving influence. Recent evidence from Bode’s (2016, 12–13) study of online 
engagement in the US suggests there are few gender differences but there is a divide based on the 
visibility of an engagement behavior: men are more likely to post about politics; women are more 
likely to comment on others’ postings and disconnect from others for political reasons. However, 
Bode did not study dual screening, and in any case our findings suggest that men’s and women’s 
motivations and perceived outcomes can differ markedly, and these might condition their 
engagement behaviors. Of course, it could be that men have unrealistic expectations and/or inflated 
views of their own agency. Either way, the gender agency divide is an important avenue for future 
research. 
 Indeed, much further research is needed in this area. One important factor is how the content 
of people’s social media posts interacts with their self-reported behaviors. Future research must aim 
to identify the achievement of influence, not just reports of influence, as we did here. This is a 
formidable challenge, but one that will continue to center dual screening research on essential 
questions of agency and democracy. 
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Table 1: Factors Predicting Motivations for Dual Screening the Debate (Ordinal Logistic Regression, Wave 1 Survey) 
 
 Information Sharing Influencing 
Gender (male) -.480*** -.127 .225** 
Age (years) -.023*** -.020*** -.009** 
Education (age of completion) -.114** -.136*** -.071 
Income (monthly household before tax) -.018** -.018* -.013 
Interest in politics .097 .112 .195* 
Internal political efficacy -.036* .041* .031 
Identifying with a party .254 .309* .225 
Level of attention to the campaign .235** .342*** .165 
Learning enough from the campaign -.188* -.031 .078 
Index of political news use .030** .000 -.001 
Index of offline political engagement .006 .030*** .038*** 
Index of online political engagement .008*** .008*** .008*** 
Frequency of access to Twitter .206** .261*** .084 
Frequency of access to other social media .012 .046 .095* 
    
N 1973 1962 1924 
Cox and Snell R2 .102 .177 .186 
-2 Log-likelihood 6733.56 6640.52 6817.46 
 
Note: cell entries are unstandardized slope coefficients for the independent variables. ***p≤.001 
**p≤.01 *p≤.05. 
 
 
 Table 2: Factors Predicting Perceived Influence on Others as a Result of Dual Screening (Logistic Regression, Wave 1 Survey) and Usefulness 
of Dual Screening in Assisting with Voting Decision (Ordinal Logistic Regression, Wave 1 Survey) 
 
 Influence on 
one’s followers 
Influence on 
Twitter users 
Influence on 
journalists 
Influence on 
politicians 
Assistance with 
voting decision 
Gender (male) .335** .116 .082 -.183 -.281** 
Age (years) -.005 .006 -.002 -.008 -.012*** 
Education (age of completion) .032 -.057 .061 -.102 -.097 
Income (monthly household before tax) .004 -.004 .009 .001 -.008 
Interest in politics -.146 -.318* -.110 -.136 -.318** 
Internal political efficacy .029 .030 .024 .006 -.048* 
Identifying with a party .065 -.154 -.553 -.121 -.003 
Attention to the campaign .054 .250 .165 -.179 -.028 
Learning enough from the campaign .001 -.167 .142 .398 .142 
Index of political news use .000 .000 .060** .031 .016 
Index of offline political engagement .012* .013* -.007 .014 .003 
Index of online political engagement .020*** .010** .010* .009 .006 
Frequency of access to Twitter .120 .042 -.083 -.004 .284*** 
Frequency of access to other social media -.042 -.030 -.087 -.128* -.013 
Importance of motivation for dual screening the debate      
Acquiring information .076 .098* .015 .134 .372*** 
Sharing information and opinions .175*** .117* -.072 -.128 .133** 
Influencing others .162*** .190*** .242*** .268*** .115*** 
Specific dual screening practices      
Watched the debate live .284 .207 -.002 .322 .186 
Tuned in after reading about the debate on social media .186 .280* .455* .428* .356** 
Read about the debate on social media -.054 -.022 .278 .192 .145 
Commented on the debate on social media .179* .231** -.016 .001 -.018 
Encountering debate information on Twitter      
Via posts on timeline .109 -.111 -.182 -.014 .361* 
Via hashtags (#) -.011 .306* .339 .577* .253* 
Via mentions (@) and Twitter direct messages .513*** .390** .292 .165 .044 
Via searching tweets -.138 -.068 .090 -.055 .022 
      
Constant -3.523*** -3.409*** -4.727*** -3.971*** 1.698** 
N 1445 1451 1447 1450 1422 
Nagelkerke R2 .265 .224 .116 .140 .282 
-2 Log-likelihood 1633.34 1689.71 966.01 913.23 3270.84 
Note: cell entries are unstandardized slope coefficients for the independent variables. ***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤.05 
 Table 3: Factors Predicting Post-Debate Engagement Activities (Poisson regression, Wave 1), Attention to the Campaign (Ordinal Logistic Regression, 
Waves 1–2) and Having Learned Enough from the Campaign (Logistic Regression, Waves 1–2) 
 
 1. Post-debate 
engagement (Wave 1) 
2. Attention to 
campaign (Waves 1–2) 
3. Learned enough  
from campaign (Waves 1–2) 
Gender (male) .004 .090 .023 
Age (years) -.008*** -.009 -.024** 
Education (age of completion) -.006 -.196 -.364** 
Income (monthly household before tax) -.005 -.017 .019 
Interest in politics .066 1.577*** -.093 
Internal political efficacy -.003 -.050 .078 
Identifying with a party .182* -.130 .181 
Attention to the campaign .012 1.931*** -.051 
Learning enough from the campaign .064 .418 1.848*** 
Index of political news use -.007 .024 .042 
Index of offline political engagement .009*** .017 .005 
Index of online political engagement .006*** -.006 .008 
Frequency of access to Twitter -.034 .421* .294 
Frequency of access to other social media -.013 -.186* -.116 
Importance of motivation for dual screening the debate    
Acquiring information .046* -.089 .005 
Sharing information and opinions .010 -.045 -.108 
Influencing others -.022 .064 .031 
Specific dual screening practices    
Watched the debate live -.019 .574 -.190 
Tuned in after reading about the debate on social media .011 .143 -.485 
Read about the debate on social media .139** .243 .100 
Commented on the debate on social media .146*** .301* .325* 
Encountering debate information on Twitter    
Via posts on timeline .110 .165 .591 
Via hashtags (#) .198*** -.053 .062 
Via mentions (@) and Twitter direct messages .092* .070 -.290 
Via searching tweets .351*** .251 -.101 
 Outcomes of dual screening    
Influence on others .113* -.106 .125 
Assistance with voting decision .170*** -.130 -.035 
    
Constant -1.520*** 5.671*** -.436 
N 1342 730 719 
Chi Square 655.11 374.31 128.44 
-2 Log-likelihood 3974.82 581.26 526.39 
 
Note: cell entries are unstandardized slope coefficients for the independent variables. When Attention to the campaign is the dependent variable, the independent 
variable for Attention to the campaign was measured at wave 1. When Learned enough from the campaign is the dependent variable, the independent variable for 
Learned enough from the campaign was measured at wave 1. ***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤.05 
 
